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Abstract 
In general equilibrium models the reference scenario is important, as the evaluation of the alternative 
policies modelled is based on their deviation from the reference scenario. The reference scenario 
relates to the development of an economic outlook for each region and sector of the model. This 
means that assumptions are made about the main drivers of growth, e.g. population growth and 
technical progress. This report provides the main assumptions used for the development of the 
reference scenario in the MEDPRO project. The report also provides a brief country and sectoral 
overview for each of the southern and eastern Mediterranean countries covered by the MEDPRO 
project.   
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Quantitative Reference Scenario 
for the MEDPRO Project 
Leonidas Paroussos, Kostas Fragkiadakis, Ioannis Charalampidis, 
Stella Tsani and Pantelis Capros 
MEDPRO Report No. 6/May 2013 
1. Introduction 
The aim of this report is to document the development of the reference scenario of the GEM-E3-
MEDPRO model, a version of the GEM-E3 model developed for the MEDPRO project. The 
development of the reference scenario is of primary importance given that in general equilibrium 
models, it is the deviations from the reference scenario that are key for policy evaluation. Within the 
MEDPRO project, the GEM-E3-MEDPRO model has been extended in order to consistently evaluate 
the impact of Euro-MED integration and of different cooperation policies. The GEM-E3-MEDPRO 
model covers the whole world and is based on the GTAP (v.8)1 database and on a database developed 
by the E3M Lab for each of the 11 southern and eastern Mediterranean countries (SEMCs) covered by 
the project, namely Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Palestine, Syria, Tunisia 
and Turkey.  
The starting point for the construction of the GEM-E3-MEDPRO reference scenario is the base year 
(the latest year for which data are available), i.e. 2007, social accounting matrices (SAMs). In the 
SAMs, the structure of the production function of each economic activity, the consumption patterns of 
households, the interdependencies among the different economic activities as well as the openness of 
the economy and the trade interlinkages between regions are defined.  
The reference scenario relates to the development of an economic outlook for each region and sector 
of the model. This means that assumptions are made about the main drivers of growth, e.g. population 
growth, and exogenous growth. The following section summarises the regional and sectoral 
disaggregation of the GEM-E3-MEDPRO model, along with the assumptions on the main drivers of 
growth (such as population and labour force employed) in the reference scenario, and gives a brief 
country and sectoral overview of each SEMC. 
2. The reference scenario 
2.1 Sectoral and regional aggregation 
The GEM-E3-MEDPRO model considers 19 countries/regions and 23 economic activities. It extends 
up to 2030 with five-year time steps. The sectoral and regional detail of the model is presented in 
Table 1 and Table 2 respectively. 
 
 
 
                                                   
1 See Global Trade Analysis Project (https://www.gtap.agecon.purdue.edu/). 
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Table 1. GEM-E3-MEDPRO sectoral aggregation  
No. Sector No. Sector 
1 Agriculture 13 Transport equipment 
2 Animal products 14 Consumer goods industries-Food 
3 Coal 15 Consumer goods industries-Rest 
4 Crude oil 16 Textiles and clothing 
5 Oil refining 17 Construction 
6 Natural gas extraction 18 Transport 
7 Gas distribution 19 Communication 
8 Transmission and distribution of electricity 20 Business-Financial services 
9 Water 21 Public services 
10 Chemical products 22 Recreational and other services 
11 Other energy intensive 23 Dwellings 
12 Electric goods – Other equipment goods     
 
Table 2. GEM-E3-MEDPRO regional aggregation  
Country/region  Code Country/region  Code 
Algeria DZA Turkey TUR 
Egypt EGY EU-10 countries a) R15 
Israel ISR New EU member states b) NEU 
Jordan JOR Southern EU member states c) EUS 
Lebanon LBN Emerging Asian economies d) EAE 
Libya LBY Rest of the OECD countries e) ROECD 
Morocco MAR Rest of the emerging economies f) REE 
Palestine PAL Rest of the Middle East g) (the Gulf region) ME 
Syria SYR Rest of the world  ROW 
Tunisia TUN   
a) Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Sweden and the UK 
b) Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Bulgaria and Romania 
c) Cyprus, France, Greece, Italy, Malta, Portugal and Spain 
d) China, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam and India 
e) Australia, New Zealand, the Rest of Oceania, Japan, Korea Republic, Canada, the US, the Rest of North 
America, Switzerland, Norway and the Rest of EFTA 
f) Mexico, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Venezuela, Albania, Belarus, Croatia, Russian Federation, Ukraine, the Rest 
of Eastern Europe, the Rest of Europe, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, the Rest of the Former Soviet Union, 
Azerbaijan and Georgia 
g) Armenia, Bahrain, Iran Islamic Republic, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Yemen 
and Iraq 
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2.2 Population and labour force 
Population data have been extracted from the International Labour Statistics database of the 
International Labour Organization (ILO) and the World Bank database.2 Projections regarding the EU 
countries have been extracted from the 2012 Ageing Report prepared by the European Commission 
(2011). For the rest of the model countries (excluding the SEMCs), the projections provided by the 
ILO up to 2020 have been employed. For the period 2020–30, the trends of the 2015–20 projection 
period are assumed to continue. For the SEMCs, the estimations of population growth for the period 
2015–30 have been based on the population projections provided by Groenewold et al. (2011). These 
were built on the qualitative analysis of Ayadi and Sessa (2011) and were developed under four 
alternative demographic scenarios (S1–S4) up to the year 2050 for each of the SEMCs.  
For the reference scenario, the population projections of scenario S1 have been used. This scenario 
describes a demographic future in which past trends are extrapolated. The assumptions underlying the 
S1 demographic projections state that the EU and the SEMCs fail to upgrade their partial and ad hoc 
style of cooperation into a coherent framework of action and collaboration on key political, security, 
economic, socio-cultural and environmental issues. In this scenario, the net migration rates observed 
over the period 2005–10 for individual countries are assumed to remain constant for the whole 
projection period, with the exception of the period 2010–15, for which it is assumed that for some 
countries emigration numbers will be higher, as a result of the political turmoil and insecurity in a 
number of countries in 2011.  
The S1 scenario assumes that the EU continues imposing severe restrictions to legal immigration. It is 
assumed that refugee stocks will not alter significantly. The presence of refugees (e.g. Iraqi refugees in 
Jordan) is assumed to put pressure on available national (health, housing) resources and the ecosystem, 
and this may, directly or indirectly, impinge on the health conditions of nationals. The presence of 
large refugee stocks may affect labour (im)migration flows, as refugees, for their survival, will try to 
compete in the local labour market, with or without work permits.  
The observed decline of fertility rates in most countries is assumed to continue and eventually remain 
at constant levels, i.e. at replacement level. This means that women, on average, give birth to 2.1 
children during their reproductive life. Improvements and a levelling-off of changes in life 
expectancies are expected to continue in the SEMCs. The recorded differentials among countries 
regarding life expectancies are assumed to remain in the future.  
Data and projections on the active population have been extracted from the ILO database. For the 
SEMCs, it is assumed that the growth of the active population follows the growth rates of the 
population group aged 15-64 over the period 2010–30 as documented in the work of Groenewold et al. 
(2011). The reference scenario assumptions on population and active population are presented in 
Table 3. 
Table 3. Population and active population in the reference scenario 
Country Population Active population (15-64) 
  Million 
persons, 
(2010) 
Million 
persons, 
(2030) 
Annual % 
growth rate, 
(2010–30) 
Million 
persons, 
(2010) 
Million 
persons, 
(2030) 
Annual % 
growth 
rate,  
(2010–30) 
Algeria 35.5 45.3 1.23 24.2 31.0 1.24 
Egypt 81.1 109.3 1.50 51.5 70.8 1.61 
Israel 7.6 9.9 1.30 4.8 6.1 1.29 
  
                                                   
2 See the websites of the ILO (http://laborsta.ilo.org/default.html) and World Bank (http://DataBank.World 
Bank.org/ddp/home.do). 
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Table 3. Population and active population in the reference scenario (cont’d) 
Jordan 6.0 9.0 1.98 3.5 5.8 2.46 
Lebanon 4.2 4.9 0.69 2.9 3.3 0.77 
Libya 6.4 8.0 1.19 4.1 5.5 1.41 
Morocco 32.0 38.7 0.97 21.2 25.9 0.99 
Palestine 4.2 7.4 2.91 2.3 4.3 3.19 
Syria 20.4 29.7 1.89 12.1 18.9 2.25 
Tunisia 10.5 12.4 0.81 7.3 8.4 0.70 
Turkey 72.8 87.7 0.94 49.2 59.6 0.96 
SEMC 280.7 362.3 1.28 183.2 239.6 1.35 
Rest of the Arab world 176.6 225.9 1.24 116.1 149.7 1.28 
EU-27 502.1 522.2 0.19 336.6 319.4 -0.27 
Emerging Asian economies 3,092.6 3,619.1 0.79 2,114.1 2,471.2 0.78 
Rest of the world 3,232.5 4,184.1 1.25 2,031.0 2,620.3 1.97 
World 7,284.6 8,913.7 1.03 4,781.0 5,800.2 1.30 
Sources: Authors’ estimations based on ILO, European Commission (2011) and Groenewold et al. (2011) data and 
projections. 
 
2.3 GDP growth 
The growth projections provided by Work Package 5 have been adopted for the reference scenario.3 
The projections are based on the extrapolation of past GDP data augmented by the projections from 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF), which are available up to the year 2015. The projections are 
based on alternative time frames ranging from 1970 to 2010. For the reference scenario, projections 
based on the time series data over the period 1970–2010 have been employed. For the GDP 
projections of EU countries, those provided in the 2012 Ageing Report by the European Commission 
(2011) have been adopted.  
In the reference scenario, the EU economy is projected to grow at a relatively slow pace. In contrast, 
the SEMC economies are projected to record relatively high growth rates and to marginally increase 
the SEMCs’ share of world GDP. Turkey is projected to remain the largest economy in the SEMC 
region in terms of GDP. Economic growth in the SEMCs is sustained by the growing population and 
the availability of relatively cheap labour and hydrocarbon resources in some of the countries. With no 
structural changes assumed, the GDP per capita projected for the SEMC region, with the exception of 
Israel, remains rather low up to 2030, as population trends are also significant. 
The SEMC region remains below the world average GDP per capita in the reference scenario 
throughout the entire projection period. No leapfrogging is assumed for the SEMCs; thus the gap 
between the EU member states and the SEMC region (excluding Israel) is projected to remain, 
indicating a lack of convergence between the EU and the SEMCs. The average GDP per capita for the 
SEMCs increases from $5,741 to $9,861 in 2030. However, the gap between these countries and the 
EU remains, because in 2030 the EU’s GDP per capita is projected to reach $45,529.  
 
 
 
                                                   
3 See Coutinho (2011). 
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Table 4. GDP and GDP per-capita projections in the reference scenario 
Country GDP GDP/capita 
(US$ 2010) 
% Share in 
World GDP 
  (bn US$, 
2010) 
(bn US$, 
2030) 
Annual 
growth 
rate  
(2010–30) 
2010 2030 2010 2030 
Algeria 157.7 286.5 3.0 4,446.9 6,363.0 0.3 0.2 
Egypt 151.6 379.1 4.7 1,868.5 3,458.6 0.3 0.3 
Israel 187.0 412.1 4.0 25,212.4 41,144.1 0.3 0.4 
Jordan 20.1 49.9 4.6 3,255.8 5,764.1 0.0 0.0 
Lebanon 28.4 52.1 3.1 6,715.4 10,887.5 0.0 0.0 
Libya 72.8 163.4 4.1 11,449.1 20,074.4 0.1 0.1 
Morocco 84.4 186.9 4.1 2,642.4 4,879.8 0.1 0.2 
Palestine 5.8 13.3 4.2 1,435.4 1,850.4 0.0 0.0 
Syria 49.8 108.5 4.0 2,440.7 3,825.8 0.1 0.1 
Tunisia 39.7 101.0 4.8 3,792.1 8,038.9 0.1 0.1 
Turkey 812.4 1,811.2 4.1 11,167.1 20,393.9 1.3 1.5 
SEMC 1,609.8 3,564.1 4.1 5,741.1 9,860.5 2.7 3.0 
Rest of the Arab world 1,349.4 3,053.2 4.2 11,192.0 19,798.8 2.2 2.6 
EU-27 17,461.9 23,694.8 1.5 34,892.9 45,529.4 28.8 20.2 
Emerging Asian economies 8,840.3 34,571.9 7.1 2,854.8 9,540.5 14.6 29.5 
Rest of the World 31,294.4 52,187.9 2.6 11,308.9 14,337.5 51.7 44.6 
World 60,555.8 117,072.0 3.4 8,951.0 14,105.5 100.0 100.0 
Source: GEM-E3-MEDPRO. 
Consumption, investment and trade are based on the historical patterns/trends of the SEMCs and on 
the convergence hypothesis over the long term. Table 5 summarises the projections regarding the GDP 
shares of private and public consumption. Table 6 summarises the projected GDP shares of investment 
and net exports. Net exports are assumed to remain positive in the hydrocarbon-producing countries, 
namely Algeria, Libya and Syria. 
Table 5. Consumption (% of GDP) 
 Private consumption Public consumption 
 2010 2020 2030 2010 2020 2030 
Algeria 38.52 41.53 44.69 14.29 14.81 15.42 
Egypt 73.06 66.95 61.65 13.84 17.54 21.30 
Israel 58.20 60.38 62.72 24.21 22.23 20.30 
Jordan 75.48 69.58 64.78 29.82 27.55 25.76 
Lebanon 72.12 67.32 63.14 32.87 29.46 26.43 
Libya 27.77 32.72 36.95 11.63 13.06 14.12 
Morocco 63.60 63.64 64.20 19.98 20.20 20.59 
Palestine 54.46 62.99 68.20 64.60 44.10 30.37 
Syria 63.31 61.23 59.96 7.56 11.90 14.18 
Tunisia 65.64 63.53 61.86 16.12 17.95 19.88 
Turkey 69.88 65.90 62.30 14.28 17.03 19.75 
Source: GEM-E3-MEDPRO. 
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Table 6. Investments and net exports (% of GDP) 
 Investments Net exports 
 2010 2020 2030 2010 2020 2030 
Algeria 29.56 27.12 24.83 17.63 16.54 15.07 
Egypt 21.78 21.54 21.59 -8.69 -6.03 -4.55 
Israel 19.70 19.79 19.94 -2.11 -2.40 -2.97 
Jordan 31.87 29.56 27.77 -37.18 -26.70 -18.31 
Lebanon 16.72 20.97 25.15 -21.72 -17.75 -14.72 
Libya 26.10 24.63 22.08 34.50 29.59 26.85 
Morocco 31.87 27.73 24.06 -15.45 -11.57 -8.85 
Palestine 37.39 34.30 31.31 -56.44 -41.40 -29.88 
Syria 11.16 13.56 15.95 17.97 13.32 9.91 
Tunisia 24.16 22.78 21.64 -5.93 -4.26 -3.38 
Turkey 21.87 21.70 21.45 -6.04 -4.62 -3.50 
Source: GEM-E3-MEDPRO. 
2.4 Economic and sectoral overview of the SEMCs 
2.4.1 Algeria 
Algeria is an export-driven economy presenting stable growth over the last years, mainly due to the 
ample hydrocarbon resources. Over the last decade, hydrocarbons have accounted for 45% of GDP. 
Investment activity is limited to projects related to hydrocarbons and is mainly spurred by government 
expenditure. Overall, the public sector is dominant in the Algerian economy, being financed by 
revenues of the oil and gas sectors. 
Attempts have been made to diversify the economy and to divert economic activities and growth away 
from the oil and gas sectors (e.g. a Complementary Plan for Growth Support 2005-2009 – see AfDB 
and OECD, 2007), but strong dependence on hydrocarbons persists. Despite the government’s 
moderate efforts, Algeria has not yet created the favourable economic environment required to attract 
foreign direct investment (FDI) and other private investment outside the hydrocarbon sector. 
According to the World Bank’s Ease of Doing Business index (2010), Algeria holds the 136th position 
out of 183 countries, showing limited ease in starting a business and in trading across borders. 
Moreover, a new law was passed in 2008 concerning the restriction of foreign participation in any 
business to 49% and a tax of 15% on repatriated capital. 
According to the IMF (2010a), the challenge for the Algerian economy is still to “ensure sustainable, 
diversified and private investment-led growth to reduce unemployment, which is still high among the 
youth”. Structural reforms are necessary in order to attract private investors and expand activities 
beyond oil and gas.  
According to Global Investment House (2008a), the following sectors are those that can generate 
diversified, sustainable economic growth: 
 the banking sector, which is currently underdeveloped and is expected to face higher future 
demand triggered by both households and private investors;  
 the telecommunications sector and especially internet services; 
 the chemicals sector, especially the fertilizer industry, since natural gas is one of the main 
primary inputs for nitrogenous fertilizers; and 
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 the construction sector, which is expected to grow further but at moderate rates, in light of not 
only the development of new infrastructure and housing but also the maintenance of existing 
infrastructure. 
In the reference scenario, hydrocarbons continue to dominate the Algerian economy. This assumption 
is based on figures for reserves in relation to production, which indicate 55.3 more years for natural 
gas production and 16.7 years for oil production, according to the BP Statistical Review of World 
Energy (BP, 2010). The energy sector is assumed to dominate domestic production throughout the 
period of study. 
2.4.2 Egypt 
Egypt has shown significant growth trends in the recent past, with an average growth rate of 5% in the 
last decade driven mainly by private investment (AfDB and OECD, 2007). According to the same 
source, in 2007 Egypt was the top FDI recipient in Africa, while according to the World Bank’s Ease 
of Doing Business index (2010), Egypt holds the 94th position in the general ranking, higher than other 
countries of the region.  
During the latest financial crisis, public investment focusing on oil, gas, water and sanitation projects 
have partly offset the decline of private domestic and foreign investment (African Economic Outlook, 
2010). Over the last years, growth has been facilitated by a steep rise in the ICT and construction 
sectors, while services and trade have remained significant driving forces of the economy. Another 
continual source of revenues for the Egyptian economy is the Suez Canal services, which are expected 
to remain significant in the baseline scenario. 
In terms of employment, Egypt faces a persistent unemployment rate of around 9%, which is relatively 
lower than the average unemployment rates experienced in the region but is foreseen as one of the 
major challenges for the development of the country (Global Investment House, 2008a) and was a 
major cause of social unrest in 2011. 
The sector employing the largest share of the Egyptian active population is the services sector (40% in 
2004), both private and public, followed by agriculture (22%) and industry (13%). According to the 
Global Investment House report (2008a), the Ministry of Investment of Egypt expects new 
employment opportunities mainly in services, trade and manufacturing. For the reference scenario, the 
services sector is assumed to remain dominant. 
According to the International Energy Agency (IEA), Egypt is a marginal net exporter of oil despite 
the steep rise in domestic and industrial energy demand in the country. Gas production is also 
significant, but due to rising demand, exports have been limited. The electricity sector consumes the 
largest share followed by the industrial sector, since a policy to switch from oil use to gas has been 
implemented in order to enable oil exports. Gas exports are facilitated by both LNG terminals and 
pipelines, with exports going to European and southern Mediterranean countries as well as to Israel 
(since 2011).  
The hydrocarbon sector contributed 12% to GDP in 2004. It is assumed to continue to grow 
moderately and be one of the major drivers of the Egyptian economy in light of upcoming projects 
mainly in gas extraction, accompanied by investment requiring gas inputs like petrochemical and 
fertilizers.  
Along with the development of the hydrocarbon sector, in the reference scenario it is assumed that 
there is no significant removal of energy subsidies, thus hindering liberalisation of the energy sector 
and discouraging relevant FDI. 
The construction sector has contributed largely to the growth of the Egyptian economy, accounting for 
8% of GDP in 2004. Housing demand is expected to continue owing to the large young population, 
but at lower growth rates because of the tight credit conditions foreseen. Foreign investment in the 
sector is assumed to reach saturation soon. Construction demand is also closely related to gas and oil 
infrastructure projects and tourism development, both of which are assumed to record moderate 
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growth to 2030 in the reference scenario. As regards the industrial sector and in particular 
manufacturing, it is assumed that the chemical industry will grow along with the development of the 
oil and gas sectors. Strong fundamentals are seen in fertilizers, given the low prices of primary inputs 
(hydrocarbons and electricity).  
The development of the agricultural sector is vital to Egypt’s sustainable growth. Agriculture is an 
important employer and a main feedstock for many domestic industries (textiles, tobacco, etc.), while 
the world’s rising food prices put an additional strain on Egypt’s stability. However, if necessary 
investment for both capital accumulation and infrastructure are not made, the contribution of 
agriculture will continually decline, thus failing to reduce imports of agricultural products and 
inducing further social inequalities.  
2.4.3 Israel 
Israel is an export-driven economy. Israel is highly dependent on the growth path of major economies. 
As stated by Standard & Poor’s (2010), “exports to [the] US and Europe are crucial to the country’s 
future growth”. Emerging economies are also potential markets for Israel’s high-tech products.  
In the reference scenario, the central macroeconomic projections provided by the IMF (2011) are 
assumed to hold throughout the period from 2010 to 2030. Demand growth is driven by exports and 
investment. In the reference scenario, the recently discovered natural gas fields (Congressional 
Research Service, 2011) are not included owing to uncertainties about the commissioning time; thus 
Israel continues to be largely dependent on imports of primary resources. 
Regarding the labour market, Israel is equipped with a highly skilled and qualified labour force. The 
major employing sectors in the country are manufacturing (15% of the total employed population in 
2004), trade (13%), real estate (13%), education (12%) and health services (10%). Over the last 
decade, unemployment rates have been relatively high (10% in 2004) but with a declining trend. 
According to the IMF (2011), real wages in Israel show a flexible response and thus unemployment is 
capped. The Israeli economy is characterised by unused resources, mainly consisting of the ultra-
Orthodox and Arabs. For the reference scenario, it is assumed that there are no real structural reforms 
and no additional investment in education and human capital; thereby unemployment is assumed to 
remain a persistent problem in the Israeli economy. 
2.4.4 Jordan 
The economy of Jordan grew at an annual average rate of 5.7% over the period 2000–10.4 The 
economy is among the smallest in the Middle East, with limited supplies of water, oil and other natural 
resources. This has resulted in the heavy reliance of the government on foreign assistance. Domestic 
production is based primarily on manufacturing industries and on public services. In the last decade, 
the manufacturing sector has accounted for 27% of GDP and the public services sector for 13%.5 
In 2004, the manufacturing sector employed about 37% of the labour force, while government services 
employed about 41%.6 The unemployment rate has averaged at levels of 14% over the last ten years. 
Demand composition has been driven mainly by private consumption. In the reference scenario, the 
economy is projected to continue to be dominated by government services and the manufacturing 
sector.  
Following recent discoveries, Jordan has been confirmed to have important uranium reserves 
estimated to range between 70,000 and 140,000 tonnes, plus a further 59,000 tonnes in phosphate 
                                                   
4 Authors’ estimations based on World Bank data on GDP growth. 
5 Authors’ estimations based on national accounts data. 
6 Ibid. 
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deposits.7 According to the World Nuclear Association, Jordan holds 2% of the world’s recoverable 
uranium resources (2007 estimates).8 With confirmation of the reserves, Jordan has signed extraction 
and trading cooperation agreements with China, the US, France and the UK.  
2.4.5 Lebanon 
Over the last decade, the economy of Lebanon has been growing at an average annual rate of 4%, 
while unemployment has recorded annual rates of 8.5% over the same period. The services sector 
accounted for about 30% of GDP in 2004.9 The major sub-sectors of the services sector are commerce 
and tourism. The tourism sector is an important part of the Lebanese economy as it drives growth for 
other sectors, such as real estate and transport, banking and retail.  
In addition to the services sector, the manufacturing and agricultural sectors have also been traditional 
contributors to economic growth in Lebanon. According to the Economic and Strategic Outlook for 
Lebanon prepared by the Global Investment House (2006), the added value of the manufacturing 
sector has been declining over recent years due to the gradual rise of other sectors of the economy, 
such as the services sector.  
With regard to the external position, in the late 2000s the government reduced customs duties, adopted 
export promotion schemes for agriculture, decreased social security fees and restrictions on investment 
in real estate by foreigners, and adopted an open-skies policy. Lebanon has also entered multiple trade 
agreements with the Arab countries and the EU, such as the Greater Arab Free Trade Agreement 
(GAFTA), the Free Trade Agreement with six Gulf Cooperation Council countries, the European 
Mediterranean Partnership Accord and the free trade deal with the nations of European Free Trade 
Association.  
In the reference scenario, Lebanon is assumed to grow at average rates of 3% over the period 2010–
30. Economic growth will be driven by the manufacturing sector and the agricultural sector. In the 
absence of significant, anticipated structural changes, the services sector (mainly tourism, banking and 
retail) is assumed to be a substantial contributor to growth. 
2.4.6 Libya 
Over the last decade, Libya has recorded levels of economic growth of 4.3% on average.10 Economic 
growth has been heavily dependent on hydrocarbons. During that period, hydrocarbons have 
accounted for more than 70% of GDP on average,11 and have generated more than 90% of government 
revenues and 95% of export earnings.12 Hydrocarbons form the largest source of public finance, while 
their ample availability has enabled the government to rely only moderately on taxation and other 
domestically generated revenues. In terms of employment, Libya has been faced with high 
unemployment rates, which have exceeded 20% on average over the last decade.  
In addition to the exploration of oil reserves, Libya has directed efforts at developing the largely 
unutilised natural gas reserves, which are estimated at 1.54 trillion cubic metres (US EIA, 2011). 
Despite the efforts to increase the share of the non-oil sector in GDP and to diversify the economy so 
as to generate more jobs, the Libyan economy appears to continue to be driven primarily by the 
economic sectors associated with hydrocarbon exploration and production. This tendency is largely 
                                                   
7 See the 2009 Minerals Yearbook (USGS, 2009) and the Annual Report (2009) by the Ministry of Energy and 
Mineral Resources of Jordan. 
8 See the World Nuclear Association (http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/inf23.html). 
9 Authors’ estimations based on national accounts. 
10 Authors’ estimations based on World Bank data on GDP growth.  
11 Authors’ estimations based on national accounts. 
12 See the Africa Economic Outlook on Libya (http://www.africaneconomicoutlook.org/en/countries/north-
africa/libya/). 
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facilitated by the fact that Libya has the largest proven oil reserves in Africa, and most analysts agree 
that the country is still underexplored.13 
Regarding its external position, Libya has been able to maintain trade surpluses. This can be attributed 
to hydrocarbons and to petroleum-based commodities, which make up 97% of exports.14 More than 
80% of the Libyan exports go to the EU, with Italy being the primary destination. 
In light of the heavy dependence of Libya on hydrocarbons and taking into account the amount of 
available proven reserves,15 for the reference scenario it is assumed that the Libyan economy will 
continue to support its growth through hydrocarbons over the period 2010–30. In the reference 
scenario, the growth path of Libya is assumed to be associated with the high dependence of the 
economy on hydrocarbons and the continuation of the non-diversification of the economy, which will 
impede the ability of the economy to create jobs. 
2.4.7 Morocco 
The economy of Morocco has recorded levels of economic growth of 5% on average over the last 
decade.16 The engines of economic growth have primarily been the services sector (trade, hotels and 
restaurants) and to a lesser degree agriculture, manufacturing and mining. In 2008, services accounted 
for more than 55% of GDP, while agriculture (including forestry and fishing) accounted for 14.6%, 
manufacturing for 14.2% and mining for more than 7%.17 
Morocco is the world’s largest exporter of phosphate, which has long provided a source of export 
earnings.18 Moroccan reserves account for around 50% of the world’s total (Cisse and Mrabet, 2004). 
With phosphate consumption growth estimated at 1-2% per year, depletion of the most economically 
exploitable reserves is estimated not to occur sooner than a period of 100 years. In this respect, the 
mining sector is expected to continue to contribute to the Moroccan economy for the foreseeable 
future. 
The economy of Morocco benefits from relatively low labour costs and its proximity to Europe, which 
sustain the key areas of the economy – agriculture, light manufacturing and tourism. In terms of 
unemployment figures, Morocco has recorded relatively lower rates compared with its neighbour 
countries. Over the last decade, the unemployment rate has averaged 10%. In the reference scenario it 
is assumed that the services and manufacturing sectors will continue to be the pillars of economic 
growth.  
2.4.8 Palestine 
Palestine is a small, closed economy influenced by political developments. The continuation of the 
Israeli–Palestinian conflict has led to severe economic shocks in the Palestinian economy. In the last 
decade, Palestine has faced ‘de-development’ due to a stagnant structure of the economy ensuing from 
political instability, military conflicts, restrictions on movement and trade, and restrictions on access to 
resources.  
According to Palestinian National Authority (2007), economic growth has been driven by agriculture, 
construction and labour remittances from Israel. The Palestinian economy is now highly dependent on 
                                                   
13 See US EIA (http://www.eia.doe.gov/countries/country-data.cfm?fips=LY). 
14 See the Africa Economic Outlook on Libya (http://www.africaneconomicoutlook.org/en/countries/north-
africa/libya/). 
15 According to BP’s Statistical Review of World Energy (June 2010 edition), the Libyan gas reserves are 
estimated to amount to 0.8% of world proved reserves.  
16 Authors’ estimations based on World Bank data on GDP growth. 
17 See the Africa Economic Outlook on Morocco (http://www.africaneconomicoutlook.org/en/countries/north-
africa/morocco/). 
18 See the CIA World Factbook (2011). 
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imports due to the economy’s small productive capacity. Israel is Palestine’s most important trading 
partner (both exporting and importing), thus leaving the Palestinian population dependent on a 
particular trading route. As a result, price movements are linked to the NIS and US$ rate movements 
(Global Investment House, 2006). 
Palestinian trade suffers from non-tariff barriers imposed by Israel and by increased transport costs 
due to restrictions for security reasons, leading to the disruption of all the trading activities of the past. 
In the baseline scenario, it is assumed that cooperation will not be achieved in the short or medium 
term and barriers will not be removed soon; hence the Palestinian economy will continue to face a 
notable trade deficit. 
As noted by the World Bank (2004), the “Palestinian economic recovery will depend on rebuilding 
commercial cooperation with Israel and third-country markets”. In the reference scenario, the high 
degree of dependency on the Israeli market is sustained and Palestine does not gain access to other 
markets; thus it is still exposed to political instability, sanctions and price fluctuations. 
Palestinian economic dependence on Israel also characterises Palestinian employment in the Israeli 
labour market. Labour remittances have long been an important source of income for Palestinian 
households; therefore, border closures and restrictions affect Palestinian economic welfare. 
Unemployment is seen as a dominant problem in Palestinian society, with limited potential for 
improvement in the baseline scenario owing to a continuation of the shutout of the Palestinian 
economy from international trade and credit markets, and the limitations on Palestinian workers in the 
Israeli labour market, given the extension of conflicts and the persistent Israeli unemployment rate. On 
a sectoral basis, agriculture is a critical productive sector according to the Palestinian National 
Authority (2007), given its contribution to food security and the ability to lead to immediate economic 
recovery.  
Industry and manufacturing are assumed to make a small contribution to GDP. This stems from the 
assumption of the continuation of a lack of credit mechanisms and access to finance, a lack of 
technological capacity and a restricted level of investment. Geopolitical instability has kept FDI very 
low in Palestine and this is assumed to continue in the baseline. 
2.4.9 Syria 
The Syrian economy is well diversified among the oil, agriculture, service and light industry sectors. 
However, during the last few years GDP growth has mainly been driven by the exploitation of the 
country’s oil reserves. The Syrian economy is facing many challenges stemming largely from the 
country’s international relations, which are characterised by US sanctions and diplomatic pressure 
regarding Lebanon and terrorism, but also from the recent social unrest in the Middle East and North 
Africa (Global Investment House, 2008b). Attempts to stabilise its international position are being 
made with the support of European leaders (The Economist, 2008). In an effort to become an open 
economy, Syria has joined free trade agreements like the GAFTA and trade agreements with Turkey, 
Europe and South America.  
State intervention still exists on a large scale through price subsidies and bureaucracy. The latter has 
put Syria in 144th position in the World Bank’s Ease of Doing Business index (2010), being 
particularly problematic in enforcing contracts and getting credit, while the former relates mainly to 
high energy subsidies that limit the possibilities for government expenditure on investment in 
infrastructure. 
Agriculture has been an important sector in terms of its share of both GDP (24% in 2004) and 
employment (30% in 2004). The Syrian state sees the agricultural sector as one of great importance for 
food security and employment as well as for preventing rural migration. According to the IMF 
(2010b), agriculture was projected to grow after the end of a severe two-year drought, but also because 
of political efforts aimed at reducing production costs for farmers (e.g. subsidising diesel prices for 
agricultural use). Nevertheless, in order to achieve long-term development of the sector, investment in 
infrastructure is required, since most of the land is rain-fed and there is a lack of irrigation systems.  
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According to the US EIA (2010), oil and gas production were expected to grow post-2010 as new 
fields come into production. Industry is gradually being privatised in Syria. The sugar, cement and 
textile sectors received the largest shares of new investment in 2006, of which 20% came from FDI 
(Global Investment House, 2008b). Industry employed around 17% of the active population in 2004 
and accounted for 17% of GDP.  
In the reference scenario, the energy sector will account for an increasing share of domestic production 
throughout the period of study. The construction sector is assumed to grow further in the short term 
owing to a focus of Arab FDI on the Syrian real estate sector and to the inflow of Iraqi nationals 
(Global Investment House, 2008b), but to become saturated by 2030. Services will continue to grow as 
a share of domestic production owing to the gradual opening of private banks and the operation of the 
Damascus Stock Exchange. 
2.4.10 Tunisia  
Economic growth in Tunisia has recorded levels on average of 5% over the last ten years.19 The 
cornerstone sectors of the economy have been services (mainly tourism), manufacturing (mainly the 
textiles, clothing, electricity and mechanical industries), agriculture and fisheries. In 2008, services, 
manufacturing, and agriculture and fisheries accounted for 53%, 20% and 10% respectively of GDP.20 
Over the last decade, the demand composition has been driven mainly by consumption. Consumption 
has accounted for more than 75% of the demand composition and 60% of GDP,21 with more than 60% 
of it consisting of private consumption. Gross capital formation has ranged from around 25% of total 
demand, with the largest share of it (ranging at average levels of 22%) being private capital formation.  
With regard to its external position, exports and imports have been on the rise over the last decade, 
recording average levels of 46% and 50% of GDP respectively. The EU remains the main trading 
partner. In 2008, the EU accounted for 64.5% of Tunisian imports and 72.1% of Tunisian exports.22 
Regarding the opening-up of the economy, the authorities have proceeded with a lowering of customs 
duties so as to comply with international commitments (World Trade Organisation, Agadir 
Agreement, Arab Maghreb Union, free trade agreements with Morocco, Jordan and Turkey and the 
Arab free-trade zone) and to stimulate economic trade across borders. Following a gradual process that 
started in 1996, since January 2008 Tunisia has constituted a free-trade zone with the EU for industrial 
products. Pending agreements relate to African countries, while negotiations on a free-trade agreement 
with the US have been at a standstill. 
In the reference scenario, services, manufacturing, and agriculture and fisheries will continue to 
dominate the Tunisian economy in the period under study.  
2.4.11 Turkey 
Over the last decade, the economy of Turkey has recorded levels of economic growth of 4% while 
unemployment has recorded annual rates of 10%.23 In the last two decades, the economy of Turkey 
has been driven by the manufacturing and services sectors, accounting for more than 16% and 39% of 
GDP on average, respectively.24 The share of the agricultural sector, the traditional backbone of the 
                                                   
19 Authors’ estimations based on World Bank data on GDP growth.  
20 See the Africa Economic Outlook on Tunisia (http://www.africaneconomicoutlook.org/en/countries/north-
africa/tunisia/). 
21 Authors’ estimations based on World Bank data and on national accounts. 
22 See European Commission, “Tunisia” (http://ec.europa.eu/trade/creating-opportunities/bilateral-relations/ 
countries/tunisia/). 
23 Authors’ estimations based on figures from the national accounts. 
24 These are 2010 estimates. See CIA World Factbook (https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/geos/tu.html). 
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economy, in GDP has been diminishing over time, ranging from 18% in the 1990s to 13% in 2004 and 
9% in 2010.25 
Turkey has also recorded increasing flows of imports and exports, which have represented increasing 
shares of GDP over the last decade. In 2004, imports accounted for 35% of GDP, while exports 
accounted for 30%.26 The textile and clothing sectors play a vital part in the export mix, yet the 
automotive, construction and electronics industries have been rising in importance (and have 
surpassed textiles) in Turkey’s export flows. For the reference scenario, Turkey is assumed to continue 
to grow at annual rates of 4%. Economic growth will continue to be driven by the manufacturing 
sector, followed by the services sector. 
  
                                                   
25 Figures for the 1990s have been retrieved from the World Bank’s database. Figures for 2004 consist of 
authors’ estimations based on data from the national accounts. The 2010 figures are estimates from the CIA 
World Factbook. 
26 Authors’ estimations based on figures from the national accounts. 
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